Password authentication is an essential and widespread form of user authentication on the Internet with no other authentication system matching its dominance. When a password on one website is breached, if reused, the stolen password can be used to gain access to multiple other authenticated websites. Even amongst technically educated users, the security issues surrounding password reuse are not well understood and restrictive password composition rules have been unsuccessful in reducing password reuse. In response, the US NIST have published standards outlining that, when setting passwords, authentication systems should validate that user passwords have not already been compromised or breached. We propose a mechanism to allows for clients to anonymously validate whether or not a password has been identified in a compromised database, without needing to download the entire database or send their password to a third-party service. A mechanism is proposed whereby password hash data is generalized such that it holds the k-anonymity property. An implementation is constructed to identify to what extent the data should be generalized for it to hold k-anonymity and additionally to group password hashes by their generalized anonymous value. The implementation is run on a database of over 320 million leaked passwords and the results of the anonymization process are considered. Password authentication is an essential and widespread form of user authentication on the Internet with no other authentication system matching its dominance. When a password on one website is breached, if reused, the stolen password can be used to gain access to multiple other authenticated websites. Even amongst technically educated users, the security issues surrounding password reuse are not well understood and restrictive password composition rules have been unsuccessful in reducing password reuse. In response, the US NIST have published standards outlining that, when setting passwords, authentication systems should validate that user passwords have not already been compromised or breached. We propose a mechanism to allows for clients to anonymously validate whether or not a password has been identified in a compromised database, without needing to download the entire database or send their password to a third-party service. A mechanism is proposed whereby password hash data is generalized such that it holds the k-anonymity property. An implementation is constructed to identify to what extent the data should be generalized for it to hold k-anonymity and additionally to group password hashes by their generalized anonymous value. The implementation is run on a database of over 320 million leaked passwords and the results of the anonymization process are considered.
INTRODUCTION

23
Password reuse poses a significant threat to password authentication systems, Das et al. (2014) observed 24 that 43% of users reused passwords across multiple websites and notes that there have been user password 25 breaches from high profile websites including Twitter, Yahoo and LinkedIn. If a password is reused 26 across multiple accounts, an attacker who is able to compromise the password from one service is able 27 to reuse the same password to compromise other user accounts. A users password can become known 28 if it is insecurely stored in an applications database and the contents of that database are disclosed.
29
Another strategy for disclosing a users password involves attempting a brute force attack by automatically 30 attempting common password combinations until a users password is known, websites which do not 31 challenge or rate limit high-frequency log-in attempts make good targets for this kind of attack. In 
41
Lists of disclosed passwords are available in bulk on the Internet; one such list, Hunt (2017), contains passwords into third-party websites in order to validate whether their password has or has not been leaked.
If such passwords are sent in their original format, it is possible for a third-party website to capture or log 48 such passwords, thereby violating their secrecy and allowing for malicious use. Submitting passwords 49 for validation in a hashed form still contains a number of security problems. Firstly when a password is 50 successfully found to be in a blacklist, it can be possible to correlate a given password to a user based on 51 characteristics of the request such as IP Address or browser signature (Eckersley, 2010) . Even where a 52 hash is not found in a database, such as a hash can be stored for later analysis; the stored hash can later be 53 compromised if a later disclosure results in an identical hash or, if the hashing algorithm itself is found to 54 be vulnerable, the plain-text may be identified.
55
In this paper, an approach is presented to allow clients to anonymously check whether a password is 56 in a database of breached passwords without needing to download the entire database. Password hashes 57 are pre-processed such that they can be queried in ranges, this allows a client to check if their password is 58 in a database of leaked passwords by only submitting the first few characters of the password hash. An 59 algorithm is proposed to discover the maximum length of the hash prefix that can be searched for such 60 that the query holds the property of k-anonymity. An implementation is built using the Go programming 61 language, with the processed data stored in a SQLite database. By running this implementation on a list 62 of over 320 million breached passwords, we are able to evaluate the practicality of using the resulting 63 data set. We find that the result size of any query is small enough for a large variety of practical use-cases, 64 whilst still maintaining anonymity for the original password hash that is queried. password. This work demonstrates that it is advantageous to alert users to password reuse, however the 78 proposed mechanism still has a non-trivial margin of error. Further; when a password is auto-filled using 79 a client-side password manager, typing patterns cannot identify password reuse (as the user does not enter 80 in the password themselves). the authors consider whether these enforcement policies make positive impact on users password behavior.
85
By performing user research, the paper considers the implication of password composition rules on the 86 resulting password. The research largely discredits the use of password composition rules, finding they 87 do not make any particular difference to human behavior. With specific regard to password reuse, the 88 research does not support the proposition that password composition rules decrease password reuse. 
Hash Functions
Given an arbitrary input x and a hash function h(input), h(x) produces an output c such that it is 102 computationally difficult to find x whilst knowing only the details of the function h and the output c (Naor and Yung, 1989).
104
The Avalanche Effect is a property of ideal hashing algorithms, whereby a tiny change in the input Hashing algorithms are deterministic; let y = h(x), no matter how many times h(x) is run, the value 114 of y will be the same each time. Lists of commonly used passwords can be hashed and stored in large 
IMPLEMENTATION
148
For our implementation; we seek to provide an API service which allows remote web services and clients 149 to validate whether a password is or is not in a database of leaked passwords, without ever needing to send 150 the password itself. In order to achieve this anonymity, a Range Query can be used such that the client 151 will request all passwords in a particular search range. This Range Query will return multiple matching 152 results, from here the client is able to determine if one of the passwords that is returned is identical to the 153 3/11 password supplied by the user. An interceptor or the operator of the API service cannot themselves tell if the client queried for a password that was breached, as the only query was for a range of data (that is 155 associated to multiple possible entries).
156
Mitigating Background Knowledge Attacks
157
In anonymizing text data, it is possible to infer attributes about the contents based on the search query.
158
For example; a search request is put to the API service for all leaked passwords starting with "8StJoh"
159
and it is known the requester resides at the address "8 St Johns Road", it is possible to infer the password 160 even if it is not in the database of leaked passwords itself. This is a known restriction in k-anonymity and 
171
Note that unlike when passwords are normally hashed, the aim here is not to ensure that the hashed 
Distributing Hashes into Buckets
179
For hashes to be able to be easily queried by third-party services, they are split into buckets which consist of maintaining k-anonymity. In this instance, as we are anonymizing one-dimensional data, it is possible 185 to implement a tree structure to allow third-parties to search for password hashes so long as any search 186 query will return a multiple hashes.
187
Take the example of a crude theoretical hashing algorithm that produces it's output as an integer 188 between 1 and 30, with the breached hash values stored in a decision tree of a similar structure to Fig. 1. 
189
The service is exposed via an API service; when a consumer wishes to run a query to check whether a 190 given hash is in the database, they will first submit an API call an endpoint which will return the range 191 of hashes available in the database and will state which questions the client needs to answer in order to 192 continue the search. This decision tree will continue until the query achieves it's desired level of accuracy,
193
at which point the complete set of hashes matching that query is returned. As the number of hashes stored in the decision tree increases, in order reduce the amount of values returned by the leaf nodes, the depth of the decision tree must also increase. B-Tree is a simple example 196 of a decision tree; with n items, the longest path of a B-Tree of order d is at most log d n nodes (Comer, 197 1979). Whilst logn difficulty can be considered small for many applications, it is important to note that at 198 each decision point an API call will need to be made. Where Internet connections have high latency (such 199 as in developing countries or for those over mobile connections) multiple API requests can be incredibly 200 slow, especially when performed in a web browser using JavaScript, and therefore this approach was not 201 suitable.
202
A similar approach could be to provide a map file which flattens a tree structure into a single index 203 file, an example of the data tree Fig. 1 represented in a flat file format is demonstrated in Fig. 2 One mechanism of doing this would be through performing arithmetic operations on the hashes.
215
Firstly the database is pre-processed by calculating the minimum possible numeric value of a hash 216 in the database alongside the maximum numeric value. For the final step in the pre-processing, we 217 calculate the maximum distance between l values in the entirety of the dataset and this becomes our 218 step value. This data is presented in an index file for the API, an example structure is shown in 
Determining Hash Prefix Length
247
A critical decision to make, prior to anonymizing data, is the length of the Hash Prefix that is used for memory utilization when dealing with large sets of hashes.
Data: passwordHashes
Result: prefixLength S = {}; prefixLength = 40; // Default prefix length set to SHA-1 hash length passwordHashes = sortAlphabetically(passwordHashes); while passwordHashes as hash do S n = hash; if |S| == 3 then A = similarPrefix(S 1 , S 2 ); B = similarPrefix(S 2 , S 3 ); similarity = max (A, B) to consider an implementation approach which also utilizes an alternative search mechanism for further 276 filtering (such as a Decision Tree). In order to determine whether distribution is a problem, we can 277 evaluate the implementation on a trial dataset.
278
EVALUATION
279
To evaluate the performance of Algorithms 1 and 3, we build an implementation that processes Hunt the Maximum Hash Prefix Length, no truncated hash would be unique.
293
Note that we concurrently read hashes from the text file into the channel, whilst running the worker 294 to run calculations. As the file containing all the hashes measures 12.86GB it is impractical on most 295 computers to load the entire file into memory prior to processing. As a result, we feed the contents of the for the number of files in a single directory.
314
As an alternative, it is possible to create a simple 2 column database structure which connects Hash
315
Prefixes to individual hashes. For the database system, our implementation uses SQLite which acts as an
316
embedded database with all the data stored in a single binary file. As a hash should only need to be stored 317 once throughout the database, a unique property can be applied to the database column. Additionally to 318 accelerate the searching of hashes when querying by the Hash Prefix, an index can be set-up on the Hash
319
Prefix column.
320
To expose this SQLite database as an Internet API service, a simple web application can be created to hashes which start with that prefix. The hashes can then be returned in plain-text or in a format like JSON.
Should performance become a constraint, HTTP caching can be used as necessary.
324
RESULTS
325
Upon running Algorithm 1 on Hunt (2017), the ideal Maximum Hash Prefix Length was found to be 5.
326
Comparison of the first 2 hashes found the common Hash Prefix size to be 8, though this incrementally 327 decreased to 7, then 6 and eventually 5 as the dataset was processed further.
328
We therefore set the Hash Prefix size to 5 when running Algorithm 3. hash needs to be compared to a database, password hashes cannot be protected using unique salts.
366
This paper presents a mechanism for providing a service to validate whether a password has been 367 in a data breach by using an anonymized version of the password hash. An implementation is designed 
373
For a client to evaluate whether a password has been breached, they will locally generalize a password 374 hash by truncating it and will then query a remote service for all password hashes which start with the 375 same prefix. From here the client can then locally validate whether their own password hash matches any 376 of the hashes provided by the remote service.
377
This implementation is evaluated on a dataset of over 320 million breached passwords and we find the 
382
Further work can consider how the uneven usage distribution of leaked passwords can impact k-
383
anonymity when searching for a hash which is connected to a previously leaked password. Additionally,
384
it can be of use to see how password security notifications affect completion rates of a website sign-up 385 forms. There is potential to explore these topics in greater detail in further work.
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